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cooperate to maximize household gains. Compared to monogamous husbands and wives, 
polygynous husbands and wives are less cooperative, one with another, and co-wives are 
least cooperative, one with another. The husbands’ and wives’ behavior in a 
corresponding series of inter-household games indicates that these differences cannot be 
attributed to selection of less cooperative people into polygyny. Finally, behavior in 
polygynous households is more reciprocal and less apparently altruistic.  
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1. Introduction  
Many programs aimed at reducing poverty in Low and Middle Income Countries (LIMCs) 
involve transfers to households of either cash or in-kind resources (Banerjee et al. 2015; Baird et 
al. 2014; Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman 2015; Morduch 2011). The optimal design of such 
programs depends on how decisions are made within households. Understandably, considerable 
attention has been given to the issue of whether positive effects on children’s and other 
household outcomes are greatest when the transfer recipient is the husband or the wife (e.g., 
Thomas 1990, 1994; Duflo 2003; Yoong et al. 2012; Akresh, de Walque and Kazianga 2016; 
Benhassine et al. 2015; Ambler 2016) and, relatedly, to husband-wife differences in resource 
allocations and to spousal cooperativeness (e.g., Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 
1981; Browning et al. 1994; Udry 1996; Iversen et al. 2011; Bezu and Holden 2015).  
However, as the roll-out of such programs in Africa gathers momentum (Garcia and 
Moore 2012), another issue is beginning to loom large: that of how such programs should be 
adapted to accommodate polygynous households. In some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, many 
in West Africa, over 40 percent of women are in polygynous marriages (Elbedour et al. 2002; 
Dalton and Leung 2014). This is raising new challenges for policy makers interested in 
optimizing program impacts and highlighting gaps in our understanding of how decision making 
differs between polygynous and monogamous households (World Bank 2010, Baland and 
Ziparo, 2017).  
In this paper, we investigate whether and how spousal cooperativeness differs between 
monogamous and polygynous households. We hypothesized that cooperation would be lower 
within polygynous households. Our reasoning was as follows. Polygyny is associated with higher 
male premarital social and/or economic status and hence better ex ante prospects (e.g., Zeitzen 
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2008; Hames, 1996; Chaudhary et al. 2015). However, it is also associated with worse welfare 
outcomes, especially for junior wives and their children, even after controlling for household 
resources and number of children (Amey 2002; Shepard 2013; Bove and Valeggia 2009; Tertilt 
2005; Hadley 2005; Gyimah 2009). The gap between ex-ante prospects and ex-post welfare 
outcomes suggests that polygynous households are less efficient and this could be owing to the 
members of such households being less cooperative. 
Cooperation could be lower in polygynous compared to monogamous households for 
many reasons including competition between co-wives, larger spousal age gaps, reduced 
paternity certainty, and lower genetic relatedness (Jankowiak, Sudakov, and Wilreker 2005; 
Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson 2012). Compared to monogamous spouses, members of 
polygynous marriages, in particular co-wives, have been found to engage in more self-serving 
strategic behavior. For instance, polygynous wives strategically raise their fertility in response to 
an increase in the fertility of their co-wives in order to maintain bargaining power over resources 
controlled by the husband (Rossi 2016); and co-wives have been found to be more conditional in 
their cooperativeness, one with another, compared to husbands and wives when cultivating land 
for household consumption (Akresh, Chen and Moore 2012, 2016). 
  By inviting spouses to make decisions with real monetary consequences in a series of 
two-person public goods games (PGGs), we generate directly comparable measures of the extent 
to which husbands cooperate with their wives, wives with their husbands, co-wives with each 
other, and husbands and wives with members of other households. We compare cooperation 
across monogamous and polygynous households and investigate whether cooperation within 
polygynous households varies depending who is interacting with whom. Using data on 
participants’ beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, we also undertake a preliminary investigation 
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into whether the differences in cooperation can be explained by differences in how husbands and 
wives condition their own cooperativeness on their beliefs about the cooperativeness of their 
spouses and co-wives. 
Overall, we find high contribution rates in intra-household games, but in polygynous 
husband-wife pairs, we find lower contribution rates than in monogamous husband-wife pairs, 
and contribution rates are even lower in co-wife pairs. In games with adults from other 
households, contribution rates are much lower and do not differ between monogamous and 
polygynous household members, suggesting that the difference in intra-household contribution 
rates are owing to an effect of the marriage institution rather than the selection of less 
cooperative people into polygyny. Further, we find that there are differences across the 
household types in the way husbands and wives condition their cooperativeness on how much 
they believe their spouses and co-wives will cooperate. Specifically, behavior in polygynous 
households is more reciprocal and less apparently altruistic than in monogamous households. 
This is consistent with findings from studies using observational data (Akresh, Chen and Moore 
2012, 2016; Rossi 2016).1 Our experiment complements these field-based studies as it allows us 
to investigate intra-household cooperation in a controlled environment and make informative 
ceteris paribus comparisons between intra- and inter-household cooperation.   
This paper contributes to the growing literature on cooperation between spouses in lab-
type experiments. Most of the studies in this literature focus on monogamous households (Peters 
et al. 2004; Munro et al. 2014; Mani, 2010; Iversen et al. 2011; Kebede et al. 2014; Cochard, 
Couprie and Hopfensitz 2014; Beblo and Beninger 2016; Castilla and Walker, 2013; Castilla 
                                                     
1 In fact, Akresh et al (2012, 2016) find that where reciprocity is greater, cooperation is higher. However, they focus on a 
decision-making context in which contributions are observable, so, free-riding is punishable and threats of punishment sustain 
cooperation. Altruism in this context undermines cooperation because it undermines individuals’ ability to credibly threaten to 
punish. In contrast, we focus on a context in which contributions cannot be observed, and free-riding cannot be punished. In this 
context, altruism supports cooperation, ceteris paribus, and so too does reciprocity but only if it is accompanied by a belief that 
the other will also cooperate.  
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2015). To our knowledge, the only other experimental study looking at intra-household 
cooperative efficiency in polygynous households is by Munro et al. (2010). However, they 
investigated neither differences in behavior across the various dyads within polygynous 
households nor differences in inter-household cooperation.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents our 
experimental design and procedures. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 concludes. 
2.  Methods 
 
2.1 Participant sample and study context 
The experiment was conducted in Kwara State, Nigeria, in June and July 2013 as a 
complement to a panel survey of 613 adults of whom 492 were married. During the final survey 
round, all adult respondents were invited to participate in a workshop to investigate how people 
make decisions about money. Of the 492 married invitees, all but four showed up. The six 
spouses of the four no-shows were excluded from the analysis. Also excluded from the analysis 
were the members of one household with two co-wives but no husband and eight polygynous 
households with three wives. The final analysis sample consisted of 448 married individuals who 
were in either monogamous (110 men, 110 women) or polygynous marriages involving two 
wives (76 men, 152 women).  
Most of the participants were from the Nupe ethnic group, the majority ethnic group in 
Niger State and an important minority in Kwara state. There are approximately 3.5 million Nupe 
and they live in central and northern Nigeria.2 Their geographical proximity to the Yoruba, the 
second-largest ethnic group in Nigeria, has led to many cross-cultural influences. Living 
                                                     
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nupe_people, accessed 08-01-2018 
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arrangements among Nupe and Yoruba people in northern Kwara state are comparable, based on 
patrilineal and patrilocal family structures in which polygyny is common (Ajadi et al., 2015).   
Nupe marriages are usually arranged, rarely formally registered and almost always 
involve a bride price (Nadel, 1942). The bride price is an exchange of resources for rights over a 
woman and a confirmation of the bonds between two families and kinship groups. The bride-
price transaction has the significance of a contract to which the two families are guarantors 
(Nadel, 1942, Katcha, 1978). The number of wives a man has is an indicator of wealth and status 
(Nadel, 1942). Both deuterogamy (i.e., marrying the wife of a deceased brother) (Ajadi et al. 
2015) and divorce are common in Nupe culture (Katcha, 1978).  
Polygynous families tend to co-reside, although each wife (with her children) usually 
occupies her own room or group of rooms within the compound and shares meals principally 
within her own nuclear household (Katcha, 1978). Formally, the Nupe adhere to the maximum of 
four wives stipulated by the Quran to ensure equal treatment of each wife. However, informally, 
more partners are allowed, for example, in the form of concubines or older ex-wives who remain 
in the family compound, and inequalities between spouses are tolerated (Nadel, 1942; 
Strassmann, 1997; Ukwuani et al. 2002).  
Individuals in our study area are predominantly involved in farming, trading and 
agriculture-related business. Thirty percent of married women work as farmers or farm laborers, 
while 60 percent are traders. Despite similarities between Yoruba and Nupe (see also Oni, 1996), 
rural Nupe women have somewhat greater agency over productive resources compared to their 
Yoruba neighbors (Ajadi et al, 2015).  Decision-making power is tilted towards Nupe men in 
what types of crops to grow, which agricultural inputs to purchase, and whether to sell land and 
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large livestock, and towards Nupe women in the sale of smaller animals (goats, chicken) and 
when to take crops to the market. Women generally generate and keep part of their own income.   
Table 1 provides descriptive information about our participant sample. Notable 
differences across the monogamous and polygynous sub-samples are that polygynous households 
are larger, polygynous husbands have more children, and the wives of polygynous husbands tend 
to be less educated. Moreover, polygynous households are more likely to be Muslim and reside 
in rural areas. We will control for these differences in the analyses. 
(Table 1 around here) 
2.2 Experimental task 
Each participant played a series of linear two-person public goods games (PGGs). At the start of 
each game, a participant was given an initial endowment. Initial endowments varied and were 
known only to the recipients.3 With a 95 percent probability, a participant’s initial endowment 
was 220 Naira (₦220) in each game (approximately US$1.50, one-third of median daily cash 
income).4 However, each participant faced a 5 percent chance of receiving an initial endowment 
between ₦180 and ₦20. The range of possible initial endowments was common knowledge, but 
participants did not know the probabilities associated with each. 
Each participant then had to decide, in private, how much of that initial endowment to 
contribute to a shared fund and how much to keep. The money they chose to keep they could put 
in their pocket straight away. Once both playing partners had made their contributions, the 
shared fund was multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally between the two. Participants maximized 
their joint earnings from the game by contributing their entire initial endowment to the shared 
fund. However, a participant maximized individual earnings, given any playing partner’s 
                                                     
3 This gave spouses a chance to hide money from each other. 
4 The median daily cash income from employment, agriculture and business for the participant sample was ₦600. The 
exchange rate at the time of the games (July 2013) was US$0.615 = 100 Naira. 
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contribution, by contributing nothing and going home with his or her own initial endowment plus 
three-quarters of the partner’s contribution.   
Each participant played the PGG three times, each time with a different playing partner. 
Every monogamous husband (wife) played one game with his (her) wife (husband). Every 
polygynous husband played one game with each of his two wives. Every wife of a polygynous 
husband played one game with her husband and one with her co-wife.  In addition, monogamous 
(polygynous) spouses played their remaining two (one) games with an adult from another 
household (inter-household).   
At the start of each intra-household PGG, participants were told the precise identity of 
their playing partner. At the start of each inter-household PGG they were told that they were 
playing with “a man” or “a woman” in the same workshop. Hence, participants in the inter-
household games played with adults from other households and they did not know their playing 
partners’ identities, only their gender.5 
The order of the games was randomized and participants received no indication that 
husbands, wives, and co-wives would play together until the start of their first intra-household 
game. These design details both minimized the likelihood of, and allowed us to investigate and 
rule out the possibility that participants played their three games as a portfolio rather than as a 
series of separate interactions. Ruling out portfolio decision-making is important because, in the 
presence of such decision-making, any observed behavioral differences across monogamous and 
polygynous households could be owing to the former playing only one intra-household game, 
while the latter played two. For instance, polygynous husbands and wives could contribute 
                                                     
5 Had we revealed the identity of the inter-household playing partners, both their reputations and the characteristics of their 
relationships, while unknown to us, would have affected contribution decisions. 
  
8 
 
differently from monogamous husbands and wives owing to differences in total expected 
earnings from the three games.6  
After playing all three games, participants were asked to guess how much their partner in 
each game contributed, assuming an initial endowment of ₦220. The beliefs were not elicited 
before playing the games to avoid priming the participants to think specifically about strategic 
considerations.  
Participants received their earnings from the three shared funds to which they could have 
contributed as a single payment with no breakdown at the end of the workshop. Because of this 
and the fact that participants’ initial endowments were known only to themselves, participants 
could contribute significantly less than their initial endowments while claiming to have 
contributed all.  
2.3 Procedures 
A single team conducted the workshops in all 16 communities. In each workshop, the 
participants received training in the PGG as a group. Then, during one-to-one interviews, each 
participant’s comprehension was tested and their contribution decisions elicited.7 Once all the 
participants had made their decisions, each was paid in private. At every stage of a workshop the 
team followed a script and detailed protocol. The workshops were conducted entirely in Nupe.8 
In most communities, two workshops were conducted, both on the same day. The 
exceptions were two small villages where a single workshop was planned due to small sample 
size, four villages in Shonga district in each of which the two planned workshops were 
amalgamated into one for logistical reasons, and one town (Lafiagi town) in which three 
                                                     
6 In Online Appendix Section 3, we test for portfolio effects and show that they are not driving our results. 
7 Comprehension of the game was good with more than 90% of test questions correctly answered. 
8 See Online Appendix Section 6 for English translations of the scripts, the corresponding visual aids, and the detailed 
protocol.  
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workshops were held due to large sample size. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
workshops in their community. On average, a workshop involved 28 participants (minimum 
eight, maximum 50) and participants earned around ₦847 from the games plus a ₦250 show-up 
fee.  
Substantial care was taken to avoid communication within workshops and spillovers 
within and between communities. The workshops took place in community buildings, such as 
schools or health or community centers, with at least two separate rooms. The group training was 
given to all the participants in one room. The second room was used as a waiting room for those 
who had completed their interviews. Preplanned seating arrangements in the training room 
ensured that marriage groups (spouses as well as co-wives) were separated. Participants were not 
allowed to talk to each other until they had finished their individual interviews and reached the 
waiting room, where they received a drink and a snack.  
Participants in the two workshops in a community were not allowed to mix to avoid 
communication.9  Workshops within a single district were planned such that they would start the 
day after the weekly market day in that district. Spillovers between communities on days other 
than market days were expected to be very limited.  
 
3.  Results 
 
3.1 Contribution rates by marriage type 
The left-hand panel of Figure 1 presents the distributions of contribution rates for monogamous 
and polygynous spouses and co-wives when playing one with another, within households, and 
the bars in the right-hand panel present the corresponding mean contribution rates. The test result 
                                                     
9 In Lafiagi, the third workshop was held on a second, consecutive day. Participants in Lafiagi were dispersed across 
neighborhoods, limiting potential communication between participants assigned to different workshops. 
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in the right-hand panel pertains to the null hypothesis that mean contribution rates do not differ 
across polygynous and monogamous marriage groups.  
(Figure 1 around here)  
Overall, intra-household contribution rates are high. The left-hand panel reveals that 
within both household types, most spouses contributed their entire initial endowment. However, 
the right-hand panel indicates that polygynous marriage group members were, on average, 
significantly less cooperative, one with another, compared to those in monogamous marriages (p 
= 0.047). On average, monogamous spouses contributed 88 percent of their initial endowment to 
the shared fund, while polygynous spouses contributed only 78 percent.10   
3.2 Contribution rates by participant and playing partner type 
Next, we investigate whether cooperation within each household type varies systematically 
depending on who is interacting with whom. Figure 2 presents the mean contribution rates for 
each type of husband and wife when interacting with their spouses and, in the case of wives of 
polygynous husbands, their co-wives. The figure also presents the results of a series of 
comparison-of-means tests focusing on various pairs of defined subsamples.11  
(Figure 2 around here) 
Figure 2 indicates that, when playing with their spouses, polygynous husbands and wives 
contributed significantly less than monogamous husbands and wives: 80 percent on average 
compared to 88 percent (p = 0.051). Further dividing the sample reveals that, when playing with 
their wives, polygynous husbands contributed significantly less than monogamous husbands: 79 
                                                     
10 The decisions made in the intra-household PGGs reflect both a willingness to make financial contributions to the common 
pot and, working in the opposite direction, a willingness to hide personally held resources. We find a correlation between 
decisions made in the intra-household PGGs and how much participants knows about each other’s finances in everyday life, but 
no correlation with financial contributions to household expenditures. For further details see Section 5 of the Online Appendix. 
11 These test results were derived from the regressions presented in Appendix Table A1. 
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percent on average compared to 89 percent (p = 0.033). In contrast, the difference between the 
contributions made by the wives of monogamous and polygynous husbands when playing with 
those husbands was not significant: 87 percent compared to 80 percent (p = 0.133).  
The figure also indicates that, while the contribution rates of wives in polygynous marriages 
playing with their husbands were statistically indistinguishable from their husbands’ contribution 
rates (80 percent compared to 79 percent), the contribution rates of co-wives when playing with 
each other were significantly lower at 76 percent (p = 0.068 in a pooled analysis, p < 0.001 in a 
within-wife (fixed effects) analysis).  
To sum up, Figure 2 reveals that the lower contribution rate in polygynous households 
compared to monogamous households was driven by two factors. First, when playing with their 
spouses, polygynous husbands and wives contributed significantly less than monogamous 
husbands and wives, with the difference being driven primarily by husbands. Second, when co-
wives played together, their contribution rates were significantly lower than when they played 
with their husbands. 
 
3.3 Controlling for other factors  
Next, we investigate whether the differences described in 3.1 and 3.2 are owing to cross-
subsample variations in the participants’ experiences during the experimental sessions or 
individual characteristics. Column (1), Table 2, presents the regression results supporting the key 
comparison-of-means findings already described.12 Column (2) presents the same set of 
regression results but after socio-economic and experimental controls have been added.13  
                                                     
12 The within-wife, fixed effects, regression is omitted in the interest of brevity. 
13  See Online Appendix Section 2 and Tables A2-A5 for definitions of control variables and the results of the regressions 
with controls in full. See Online Appendix Section 3 and Tables A6-A8 for analyses including further controls that allow us to 
rule out portfolio decision-making.   
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 (Table 2 around here) 
In Panel A, adding these controls has very little impact on the size and significance of the 
mean difference in contribution rates between monogamous and polygynous marriage group 
members when playing intra-household games. The same applies when focusing on husband-
wife interactions only in Panel B.  
In Panel C, adding controls reduces the size and significance of the difference between 
monogamous and polygynous husbands. Indeed, once the controls are added, we can no longer 
reject the null that monogamous and polygynous husbands are equally cooperative when 
interacting with their wives. This loss in significance is owing entirely to the inclusion of number 
of children in the regression.14 This is suggestive of a possible mechanism driving the mean 
difference. However, when number of children is included, while the p-value on the Polygynous 
identifier increases to 0.120 (just insignificant) the p-value on the number of children variable is 
0.950, indicating a loss of power owing to multicollinearity rather than mechanism identification. 
The Polygynous identifier and the number of children variable are, indeed, highly correlated (p = 
0.038, see Table 1 for subsample means).    
Panel D focuses on wives’ contributions only, and includes a variable for polygynous wives 
playing with a female playing partner (‘P x FPP’) to identify the difference in the 
cooperativeness of polygynous wives depending on whether they are interacting with their 
husbands or their co-wives. When controls are added, the difference between wives of 
monogamous and polygynous husbands (indicated by the coefficient on Polygynous) increases 
and becomes significant at the 5 percent level (p = 0.034). This gain in significance cannot be 
                                                     
14 See Online Appendix Table A4. The number of children with the playing partner (instead of total own number of 
children) and its interaction with Polygynous are not significant either (results available upon request). 
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attributed to the inclusion of any one specific control.15 The inclusion of controls does not affect 
the significant difference in polygynous wives’ contribution rates depending on whether they are 
interacting with their husbands or their co-wives.    
 
3.4 Selection versus causation 
Next, we investigate whether the difference in contribution rates between monogamous 
and polygynous households is causal, i.e., being in a polygynous marriage causes people to be 
less cooperative, or owing to selection, i.e., less cooperative people select into polygyny.  
If cooperation is lower in polygynous households as a result of selection, we would 
expect members of polygynous households to be less cooperative also when playing with 
members of other households, i.e., when playing inter-household games. The whiskered white 
circles in the right-hand panel of Figure 1 indicate the mean contribution rates by the same 
samples of spouses but when playing with members of other households. Contributions by both 
monogamous and polygynous spouses were significantly lower in inter-household games and, if 
anything, the contribution rate for the monogamous spouses was lower (36 percent) than the 
contribution rate for the polygynous spouses (39 percent).16 In Table 2, Columns (3)-(4), we 
show that this difference is statistically insignificant for the full sample (Panel A).   
Focusing on the husbands, in Table 2, Panel C, Columns (3)-(4), we investigate whether 
men who select into polygynous marriage are less cooperative towards others in general and 
towards women specifically. We do the latter by including an indicator for whether the playing 
partner was female and the interaction between this and Polygynous in the analysis. The 
insignificance of the coefficient on Polygynous indicates that there was no difference in the 
                                                     
15 See Online Appendix Table A5. 
16 These contribution rates are similar to those observed in public good games around the world. For example, Wilkinson 
and Klaes (2012) indicate that, in general, anonymously matched unmarried subjects contribute about half of their endowments.  
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contribution rates of monogamous and polygynous husbands when they were playing with men 
from other households. The insignificance of the coefficient on the interaction between 
Polygynous and Female playing partner indicates that playing with a woman rather than a man 
from another household did not affect contribution rates differently for polygynous versus 
monogamous husbands. Finally, the insignificance of the sum of the coefficients on Polygynous 
and the interaction term indicates that there was no difference in the contribution rates of 
polygynous and monogamous husbands when they were playing with women from other 
households.  
Turning to the wives, the insignificant coefficients on Polygynous in Table 2, Panel D, 
Columns (3)-(4), indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the wives of 
monogamous and polygynous husbands were equally cooperative when playing with men to 
whom they were not married. 
Finally, consider the finding that the contribution rates of co-wives when playing with 
each other were lower than when they were playing with their husbands (see Table 2, Panel D, 
Column (1)). As the critical difference is within wife, this cannot be owing to selection of women 
into polygyny based on their cooperativeness with other people. However, women who are less 
inclined to cooperate with other women, while being no less inclined to cooperate with men, 
could have selected into polygynous marriage. The statistical insignificance of the coefficient on 
the interaction between Polygynous and Female playing partner in Table 2, Panel D, Column 
(3), indicates that we cannot reject the null that, in inter-household games, playing with a woman 
did not affect contribution rates differently for wives of monogamous versus polygynous 
husbands.  
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In sum, these estimations offer no evidence of selection of men and women into polygyny 
based on either their cooperativeness with other people in general or their differential willingness 
to cooperate with men and women. Thus, we conclude that the lower cooperation rate within 
polygynous marriage groups was owing to an effect of the marriage institution rather than 
selection. Polygyny causes spouses to be less cooperative, one with another. Further, within 
polygynous marriages, wives are even less cooperative with their co-wives than they are with 
their husbands.   
 
3.5 The conditioning of cooperation on beliefs about others’ cooperativeness  
One possible explanation for the difference in intra-household cooperativeness between 
monogamous and polygynous marriage groups is that the behavioral foundations of cooperation 
vary across the two types. Cooperation can be motivated by altruism, in which case husbands 
and wives will not deviate from full cooperation even when they believe that their spouse is 
likely to do so. Adherence to a strong cooperative norm would have a similar effect. 
Alternatively, cooperation may be based on reciprocity and, hence, conditional on the 
cooperation of others. In this case, husbands and wives will deviate from full cooperation when 
they believe that their spouse or co-wife will do likewise. More conditional and less altruistic or 
norm-driven unconditional cooperation could explain the lower cooperation rate within 
polygynous households. Using data on participants’ beliefs about their playing partners’ 
contributions, we can undertake a preliminary investigation into whether participants’ own 
contributions are conditioned on beliefs about others’ contributions and whether this varies 
across monogamous and polygynous households.17  
                                                     
17 The usefulness of this analysis depends on the quality of the beliefs data. If the elicited beliefs are inaccurate or biased and 
the inaccuracy or bias differs between members of monogamous and polygynous households, the validity of our comparative 
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 (Figure 3 around here) 
Figure 3 presents the estimated linear relationships between husbands’ and wives’ own 
contributions and their beliefs about their playing partners’ contributions for: monogamous 
husbands and wives when playing with each other (solid dark, purple line); polygynous husbands 
and their wives when playing with each other or wives with their co-wives (solid light, green 
line); monogamous husbands and wives when playing with members of other households 
(dashed dark, purple line); polygynous husbands and their wives when playing with members of 
other households (dashed light, green line).18  
Focusing, first, on intra-household interactions, husbands and wives who believed that their 
spouses or co-wives would contribute 100 percent of their initial endowments chose to contribute 
95 percent of their own initial endowment on average, regardless of whether their household was 
monogamous or polygynous. However, husbands and wives who believed that their spouses or 
co-wives would contribute less than 100 percent conditioned their own contributions differently 
depending on whether their household was monogamous or polygynous. 
Within monogamous households, a 10 percentage point reduction in belief about a spouse’s 
contribution is associated with a 4 percentage point reduction in one’s own contribution. Within 
polygynous households, a 10 percentage point reduction in belief about a spouse’s or co-wife’s 
contribution is associated with a significantly (p = 0.006) larger 7 percentage point reduction.19 
This analysis, combined with the histogram in the left-hand panel of Figure 1, indicates that full 
cooperation is a common reference point for members of both monogamous and polygynous 
households, but that they respond differently when they anticipate that their spouses or co-wives 
                                                                                                                                                                           
findings would be undermined. Online Appendix Section 4 and Table A9 present the beliefs data and rule out concerns about its 
quality. 
18 Figure 3 is derived from the regressions presented in Online Appendix Table A10, columns (1) and (3). 
19 These findings are robust to the inclusion of experimental and socio-economic controls (see Online Appendix Section A4 
and Table A10). When the controls are added, we also find that cooperation is significantly more conditional between co-wives 
as compared to between polygynous husbands and their wives (p = 0.070). 
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are going to deviate from this reference point. A closer inspection of the data reveals that the 
difference between the estimated relationships is primarily owing to differences in the relative 
frequencies of full unconditional versus conditional cooperation.20  
Here, once again, we can exploit the inter-household PGGs involving the same husbands 
and wives to investigate whether being in a polygynous marriage causes individuals to become 
more reciprocally cooperative with their spouses and co-wives or whether more reciprocating 
types are more likely to select into polygynous marriages. We cannot reject the null that the two 
dashed lines in Figure 3 have the same intercept and the same slope. When playing with 
members of other households, a 10 percentage point reduction in belief about a playing partner’s 
contribution is associated with a 5 percentage point reduction in one’s own contribution.21 It is 
also worth noting that the conditioning of cooperation on beliefs differs markedly depending on 
whether the interaction is intra- or inter-household. In the former, cooperation tends to be either 
high and unconditional or conditional. In the latter it tends to be either minimal and 
unconditional or conditional.22   
To sum up, monogamous spouses are more inclined to be unconditionally cooperative, that 
is, they contribute (almost) their entire initial endowment irrespective of how much they expect 
their spouse to contribute. In contrast, when polygynous household members expect their 
spouses or co-wives to deviate from full cooperation, they are more inclined to make 
conditionally cooperative decisions, that is, to contribute approximately the same amount as they 
expect their spouse or co-wife to contribute. Thus, cooperation appears motivated more by 
altruism or adherence to a strict cooperative norm in monogamous households and more by 
                                                     
20 See Online Appendix Section 4 and Table A11 for details. 
21 Online Appendix Table A10 indicates that these findings are robust to the inclusion of experimental and socio-economic 
controls.  
22 See Online Appendix Section 4 and Table A11 for details. 
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reciprocity in polygynous households. Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that individuals 
select into polygyny depending on how they condition their cooperativeness on their beliefs 
about others’ cooperativeness.  
4.  Conclusion 
Using a carefully designed experiment to measure cooperation between all possible 
interacting pairs within monogamous and polygynous households, we find that, while intra-
household cooperation is high and the majority of spouses aim to maximize joint utility, 
cooperation is lower within polygynous compared to monogamous households. In part, this is 
because cooperation is lower between polygynous husbands and their wives as compared to 
monogamous husbands and their wives and, in part, this is because cooperation is particularly 
low between co-wives. In contrast, we find no differences in cooperativeness between 
monogamous and polygynous spouses when they interact with men or women from other 
households, indicating that the differences in intra-household cooperation are causal rather than 
owing to selection. 
Turning to behavioral foundations, we find that cooperation between monogamous 
spouses tends to be unconditional and consistent with high levels of pure altruism or strict 
adherence to norms of spousal cooperation. In comparison, cooperation between polygynous 
spouses and co-wives tends to be more reciprocal, a considerable proportion cooperating only to 
the extent that they believe the other with whom they are interacting will cooperate. Further, 
when playing with members of other households, there is no difference in how monogamous and 
polygynous spouses condition their contributions on beliefs about the other’s contribution, 
indicating that the differences in the foundations of cooperation between monogamous and 
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polygynous households are not owing to reciprocal types being more inclined to select into 
polygyny. 
The experiment was designed to document whether and how cooperation differs between 
polygynous and monogamous households and to rule out potential selection of less cooperative 
individuals into polygyny. While there is more research to be done, especially with regard to the 
behavioral and other mechanisms underpinning the differences in cooperation that we observe, 
our findings provide a strong foundation upon which to build. 
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